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GOVERNANCE ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER EU COMPETITION 
ACTIONS: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 
MIHAIL DANOV AND FLORIAN BECKER 
  
 
Abstract: The authors have aimed to produce a theoretical model which considers the choice of 
governance design of cross-border EU competition law actions. To this end, they have analysed 
WKHFXUUHQWOLWLJDWLRQSDWWHUQDQGOLWLJDQWV¶VWUDWHJLHV. On this basis, the specific issues which 
arise in cross-border EU competition law actions have been identified with a view to proposing 
an appropriate course for any reform in the area. A mix of research methods have been used - in 
addition to employing traditional library based legal research methods, opinions of legal 
practitioners from England and Germany and policy-makers from Brussels have been 
considered. The article demonstrates that, given the diverse nature of the European Union, a new 
mode of governance should be used by the EU legislator in order to close the EU competition 
law enforcement gap. The authors suggest that Regulation 1/2003 should incorporate a 
specifically designated private international law mechanism which promotes inter-jurisdictional 
regulatory competition in the area of EU competition law dispute resolution, and produces 
efficient enforcement results in a multi-level system of governance. It has been submitted that 
some of the specific problems that arise may be best addressed by appropriately drafted private 
international rules which address inter alia the low mobility of consumers and SMEs.  
A. INTRODUCTION AND SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (ex Arts 81 and 82 TEC) are the main competition law provisions 
contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Regulation 1/2003 replaced 
the centralised system, which was set up by Regulation 17/1962, with a directly applicable 
H[FHSWLRQV\VWHP LQZKLFK WKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶FRXUWVKDYH WKHSRZHU WRDSSO\DQGHQIRUFH
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Previous research has shown that, through enhanced private 
antitrust enforcement reform, private international law has gained a pivotal role in EU 
competition law disputes with an international element in Europe.1 The important role of private 
international law in the context of competition law enforcement is further re-iterated in recent 
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edited collections of papers.2 The aim of EU competition law enforcement policy is to deter 
infringements and provide redress to those who have suffered harm from them.3 However, 
research demonstrates that there is an enforcement gap at present.4 The Ashurst study, which 
was conducted in 2004, appears to indicate that the private antitrust enforcement in Europe may 
EH FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ LWV ³DVWRQLVKLQJ GLYHUVLW\ DQG WRWDO XQGHUGHYHORSPHQW´5 The level of 
diversity in the area may be regarded as problematic because the EU relies on the individual 
0HPEHU6WDWHV¶OHJDORUGHUVWRHQIRUFHWKH(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZSURYLVLRQVDQGWKHULJKWVRIWKH
individuals derived from the TFEU. It is well established WKDW WKHUH DUH ³WKUHH W\SHs of 
Community Courts, not just two: the ECJ, the CFI, and national courts. [...] The rationale for 
inclusion of national courts in [the EU judicial system] is of course that they are enforcers of 
>(8@ ODZ LQ WKHLURZQ ULJKW >@´6 The problem is that even jurisdictions like England and 
Germany, which represent the leading competition law regimes in Europe, appear to be 
attracting primarily follow-on actions.7 This is a cause for concern as public enforcers across 
Europe are unlikely to have the resources to investigate all the complaints they receive.8 
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Moreover, even in cases where competition law infringements were established, a significant 
number of injured parties9 (i.e. consumers and businesses) from across Europe would remain 
uncompensated as it would normally be the large purchasers suing.10 Recent research on 
FROOHFWLYHUHGUHVVDFWLRQVDFURVV(XURSHKDVGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDW³WKHQXPEHURIDFWLRQVUHODWHG
WR DQWLWUXVW LQIULQJHPHQWV LV VWLOO YHU\ OLPLWHG´11 The existence of an enforcement gap was 
recently noted by the UK Government12 in its response to the consultation on options for reform. 
,WZDVVXEPLWWHGWKDW³WKHVWURQJVHQVHIURPWKHFRQVXOWDWLRQZDVWKDW>FRPSHWLWLRQODZ@FDVHV
are almost exclusively between large companies, and that smaller companies and consumers 
VWLOOKDYHQRUHDOLVWLFZD\RIFKDOOHQJLQJEUHDFKHVRIFRPSHWLWLRQODZRUJDLQLQJUHGUHVV´13  
Shall the EU legislator address the existing enforcement gap? It is well established that 
private enforcement is intended to complement public enforcement by allowing injured parties 
who have suffered harm caused by a competition law infringement to bring a legal action before 
a court.14 ,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW³WKHFDXVHRIDFWLRQ>IRU(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZGDPDJHV@LVD
PL[WXUHRI(8ODZDQG>«@µGRPHVWLF¶ODZ´15 First as a matter of EU law it must be shown 
that an entity is in breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Secondly, it must be shown, as a 
PDWWHURIGRPHVWLFODZWKDWDQHQWLW\ZKLFKLVUHFRJQLVHGE\D0HPEHU6WDWH¶VODZLVOLDEOH
in damages to this particular injured party for that breach.  
Different Member States may adopt different solutions with regard to the appropriate 
measure of damages in an EU competition law claim. Although the principle of national 
procedural autonomy is subject to the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, the Member 
States would enjoy procedural autonomy to decide on the relevant procedural rules and 
UHPHGLHV LQ VR IDU DV WKH\ GR QRW PDNH µSUDFWLFDOO\ LPSRVVLEOH RU H[FHVVLYHO\ GLIILFXOW WKH
exercise of rights FRQIHUUHGE\(8ODZ¶16 Given the fact that the problem is not dealt with at 
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the EU level, the principle of national procedural autonomy17 might suggest not only that it is 
for a national domestic system to deal with the issue of damages, but also that it is for national 
law to decide what would be the set of procedural rules which would be employed in this 
context. The lack of harmonisation may suggest that the EU competition law claims may be 
characterised by a high level of uncertainty18 in so far as such claims would be often cross-
ERUGHULQQDWXUHZKLFKVXJJHVWVWKDW³NQRZOHGJHRI>VHYHUDO@OHJDOV\VWHPVLVUHTXLUHG´19 It has 
been submitted WKDW³>L@WLVWURXEOHVRPHIRUWKHOLWLJDQWVZKRZLOOKDYHWRJRWKURXJKWKHRIWHQ
difficult procedure of ascertaining and applying foreign law. In many cases, the variation of the 
substantive laws in Europe is a true non-WDULIIWUDGHEDUULHU´20  
Previous comparative studies - revealed by the Ashurst Report21 as well as by the 
Collective Antitrust Redress Report22 ± strongly suggest that harmonisation must be considered 
by the EU legislator.23 The academic debate was recently renewed by the authors of the 
collective redress report who made a case for procedural harmonisation24 at EU level.25 Such a 
deduction can be further strengthened by noting that ³it is readily apparent that inadequate 
national remedies and procedural rules can frustrate the effective application of [EU] law within 
each Member State.´26 In other words, some form of procedural harmonisation may be justified 
by the need to avoid anomaly allowing the different Member State courts to award different 
amounts of damages with regard to the same type of breach of the same EU competition law 
provision. Professors Weatherill and Beaumont have noted tKDW ³>D@ VLWXDWLRQ ZKHUH WKH
application of [European Union] law varies significantly from member state to member state 
would be a denial of the rule of law and would make the [Union] untenable. However, the 
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(XURSHDQ&RXUW¶VDWWHPSWWRDFFRPPRGDWHGLIIHUHQces in national procedural law means that 
VRPHYDULDWLRQVZLOORFFXU´27 
The European Commission has agreed upon a package of legislative proposals with a 
view to providing for an effective EU competition law enforcement regime in Europe.28 More 
specifically, the Commission has put forward a proposal for a Directive on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union.29 The corrigendum of the text of 
the Directive, which was adopted by the European Parliament, was very recently formally 
approved by the EU Council of Ministers.30 The Directive is complemented by a 
Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress in 
the Member States concerning violation of rights granted under Union Law31 as well as by a 
Communication on quantifying harm in actions based on breaches of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.32 In this context, the European Commission has justified approximation of national 
substantive and procedure rules at EU level as follows:  
³7RHQVXUHDPRUHOHYHOSOD\LQJILHOGIRUXQGHUWDNLQJVRSHUDWLQJLQWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHWDQGWR
improve the conditions for injured parties to exercise the rights they derive from the internal 
market, it is therefore appropriate to increase legal certainty and to reduce the differences 
EHWZHHQWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVDVWRWKHQDWLRQDOUXOHVJRYHUQLQJDFWLRQVIRUDQWLWUXVWGDPDJHV´33  
 
How appropriately may the level of variation with regard to the various national regimes 
be addressed by the Directive for antitrust damage actions? The authors demonstrate that a 
major challenge for the policy-makers relates to the governance aspects of EU competition law 
litigation34 which must be addressed head-on with a view to closing the enforcement gap in a 
cross-border context. In light of the current Damages Actions Initiative,35 this article 
demonstrates that the EU legislator should carefully consider what mode of ³JRYHUQDQFH´36 
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should be used with a view to setting up an effective enforcement regime in Europe, and 
addressing the specific problems that arise in a cross-border context. The European 
Commission37 has identified the five principles, which would be essential for an appropriately 
designed good governance system, as being ³RSHQQHVV SDUWLFLSDWLRQ DFFRXQWDELOLW\
HIIHFWLYHQHVVDQGFRKHUHQFH´38 In his analysis of the new modes of EU governance, Armstrong 
KDVQRWHGWKDW³>W@KHUHLVDUHODWLYHDJUHHPHQWRQµKLHUDUFK\¶RUµFRPSHWLWLRQ¶DVGLVWLQFWPRGHV
RIJRYHUQDQFH´39 Furthermore, Muir-:DWWDQG$UUR\R¶VIRUWKFRPLQJ edited book ³H[SORUHV
the potential of private international law to reassert a significant governance function in respect 
of new forms of authority beyond the state.´40 
With this in mind, a choice of governance design of cross-border EU competition actions 
may be the key for closing the enforcement gap in Europe. In this context, one should make a 
distinction between a unified/centralised system (which might include unified/hierarchical 
enforcement regime), on the one hand, and a level of managed harmonisation (setting up 
common principles and minimum standards) which presupposes an effectively functioning 
private international law regime, on the other hand. Bearing in mind this distinction, one could 
say that a private international law regime which promotes inter-jurisdictional regulatory 
competition should be used as a new mode of governance, in order to complement the proposed 
legislative package in the area of EU competition law. Although it could be questioned to some 
extent whether it is relevant to refer to ³UHJXODWRU\ FRPSHWLWLRQ´ in the area as long as the 
relevant EU competition law requires a uniform interpretation as a matter of EU law, the cross-
border nature of EU competition law infringements and the level of variation regarding the 
conditions for bringing such actions41 as well as the important role of Member States 
cumulatively VXJJHVWWKDWVRPH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶FRXUWVPight be better equipped (than others) 
to deal with such actions. Hence, a private international law regime, which promotes inter-
jurisdictional regulatory competition, might be a useful mode of governance in the light of 
cross-border aspects of EU competition law infringements. In spite of the fact that injured 
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parties (i.e. consumers and business) may be suffering harm caused by EU competition law 
infringements in a number of Member States, a unified/centralised system (which might include 
unified/hierarchical enforcement regime) is hard to achieve at EU level because ³WKH(8 LV
characterised by a low level of division of labour, limited cognitive resources and high 
GHFLVLRQDOFRVWV´42 A recent commentator has noted that:  
³DQHZVFKRRORI WKRXJKW >«@ SRUWUD\V WKH(8DVD µPXOWL-OHYHOV\VWHPRIJRYHUQDQFH¶7KLV
analysis highlights the erosion of nation-states, denies, however, their transformation into a new 
European super state. The concept of governance used is flexible enough both firmly to capture 
certain sui generis characteristics of the emerging European polity such as its lack of internal 
KLHUDUFK\ DQG LWV UHOLDQFH XSRQ µ/DZ¶ DQG WR OHDYH RSHQ WKH TXHVWLRQ RI H[DFWO\ ZKHUH WKH
European system lies on a scale between the traditional nation-state and looser forms of 
international co-RSHUDWLRQ´43 
  
The question whether an efficient EU private international law framework could be 
important ³IRUWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRIWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHWDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHIRUWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQ
of diversity in national private law´44 should be investigated in the light of the multi-level 
governance system in the EU. Private international law instruments are normally seen as an 
appropriate legislative tool, which may be used to preserve the inherent characteristics of the 
diverse legal systems within the EU, but can PIL be used as a mode of governance which 
promotes regulatory competition45 in cross-border competition cases? Before addressing this 
question, the employed research methodology will be briefly introduced. Then, the main modes 
of governance available will be introduced along with the challenges the EU policy-makers face 
when devising a policy governing the cross-border EU competition law enforcement activities. 
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&-RHUJHV´(XURSHDQFKDOOHQJHVWRSULYDWHODZ2QIDOVHGLFKRWRPLHV
true conflicts and the need for a constitutional perVSHFWLYH´Legal Studies 146 Compare: A Moravcsik, 
´3UHIHUHQFHVDQGSRZHULQWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\$OLEHUDOLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOLVWDSSURDFK´
Journal of Common Market Studies *0DUNV/+RRJKHDQG.%ODQN´(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQIURP the 
1980s: State-centric v. Multi-OHYHOJRYHUQDQFH´Journal of Common Market Studies 342; S Milio, 
From Policy to Implementation in the European Union: The Challenge of a Multi-Level Governance System 
(I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2010); M Dawson, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law: Co-
ordinating EU Social Law and Polity (CUP, 2011); D Augenstein (ed), µ,QWHJUDWLRQWKURXJK/DZ¶5HYLVLWHG7KH
Making of the European Polity (Ashgate, 2013).  
44
 A Furrer, ´European law without peak and centre? Observations on the Europanization process in private law 
towards a supranational multi-level system´ in Joerges and Gerstenberg, supra n 43, 167, 184. 
45
 H Muir-Watt, ´European integration, legal diversity and the conflict of laws´ (2005) 9 Edinburgh Law Review 
6, 7. See also H Muir-Watt, Aspects économiques du droit international privé  (5HFXHLOGHV&RXUVGHO¶$FDGpPLH
de la Haye, 2005); H Muir-:DWW´,QWHJUDWLRQDQGGLYHUVLW\7KH&RQIOLFWRI/DZVDVD5HJXODWRU\7RRO´in F 
Cafaggi (ed), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (OUP, 2006) 107; L Tichy, ´A new role for 
private international law and procedural law in European Integration? A critical comment´ in R Brownsword, H-
W Micklitz, L Niglia and S Weatherill (eds), The Foundations of European Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 
393 ± 412; A Mills, ´Federalism in the European Union and the United States: Subsidiarity, Private Law, and the 
Conflict of Laws´ (2010-1) 32 University of Pennsylvania Journal of  International Law 369-455; D Lasok and 
PA Stone, Conflict of Laws in the European Community (Professional Books Limited, 1987) 144 ± 145. 
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After that, the important issues which affect the clDLPDQWVGHIHQGDQWV¶WDFWLFVZLOOEHVSHFLILHG
On this basis, the authors will propose a theoretical model which may be used to govern cross-
border EU competition law enforcement activities with a view to closing the enforcement gap 
and providing redress for those who have suffered harm as a result of an EU competition law 
infringement. Finally, some issues, which need to be considered in a wider European context, 
will be put forward. 
 
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY46 
Since the paper aims to consider the choice of governance design of cross-border EU 
competition law actions, it is important to use a research methodology which allows the authors 
to define the cross-border competition litigation pattern.47 Indeed, the cross-border nature of 
many EU competition law infringements seemingly suggests that the way the current 
IUDPHZRUNVKDSHVWKHFODLPDQWV¶WDFWLFV would be important with a view to making a case for 
reform (and identifying an appropriate mode of governance48).  
In addition to employing traditional library based legal research methods, the authors 
thought that it would be useful to have the opinions of policy-makers and legal practitioners, to 
consider their views on how private EU competition law actions are functioning at the moment 
and how they could and should be developed. Indeed, part of the problem, which is identified 
by some of the studies49 so far, is that there are not many cases at present.50 Given that the study 
aims to identify how the cross-border EU competition law actions should be accommodated in 
Europe, qualitative interviews51 were conducted with legal practitioners in Germany and 
                                                 
46
 See also M Danov and F Becker, ´Research Methodology´ in Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 25-31. 
47
 '&KDOPHUVDQG0&KDYHV´7KH UHIHUHQFHSRLQWVRI(8MXGLFLDOSROLWLFV´LQ6.6FKPLGWDQG5'.HOHPHQ
(eds), The Power of the European Court of Justice (Routledge, 2013)  25. 
48
 Armstrong, supra n 36. 
49
 Ashurst Report, supra n 4; Collective Redress in Antitrust, supra n 4. 
50
 Compare: the UK report delivered as a part of the Ashurst Study < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/national_reports/united_kingdom_en.pdf > (last visited 
10 June 2013). 
51
 The interview questions focused on six key areas: 1) General questions about competition law disputes; 2) 
PODLQWLIIV¶WDFWLFVin cross-border EU competition law cases; 3) DefenGDQWV¶WDFWLFV and settlement; 4) Follow-on 
actions and quantification of damages; 5) Procedural issues; 6) Policy issues. These provided a structure to 
interviews. That said, the interviewer and/or interviewee were always free to depart from the structure if the 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶YLHZSRLQWVDQGH[SHULHQFHZHUHWKHUHE\EHWWHUH[SUHVVHG. See also SA Richardson, BS Dohrenwend 
and D Klein, Interviewing: its forms and functions %DVLF%RRNV5.0HUWRQDQG3/.HQGDOO³7KH
)RFXVHG,QWHUYLHZ´American Journal of Sociology  541, 541-2; NK Denzim, The Research Act: A 
Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods (Prentice Hall, 1989) 105. 
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England52 (in so far as both countries appear to be attracting EU competition law actions53) as 
well as with policy-makers in Brussels. 
The inclusion of the two categories (legal practitioners and policy-makers) can be 
justified as follows. First, the practicing lawyers from Germany and England are well placed to 
be asked questions regarding both consumer claims and claims by undertakings. Given the fact 
WKDW WKH *HRUJHWRZQ SURMHFW RQ SULYDWH DQWLWUXVW OLWLJDWLRQ DSSHDUV WR VXJJHVW WKDW µWKH YDVW
PDMRULW\RIFDVHVSRVVLEO\DVPDQ\DVSHUFHQWLQ>WKHLU@VDPSOHVHWWOHEHIRUHWULDO¶LWVHHPV
clear that the legal practitioners would have some useful insights as to how EU competition law 
litigation is functioning at present.54 Indeed, legal practitioners were well placed to provide us 
with information about litigation strategies.55 Secondly, the paper examines possible proposals 
for the reform of the European Civil Justice system the best to accommodate the post-2003 
policy of the EU favouring private law enforcement of EU competition law. The views of EU 
officials from Brussels are therefore very important; indeed, it has been submitted that the EU 
would have competence to legislate,56 and in view of the cross-border nature of EU competition 
law actions any legislative reform might be most effective at the EU level.57  
The authors randomly58 selected participants from each class (legal practitioners and 
policy-makers), ensuring that the views of respondents were representative. Lawyers were 
randomly selected from the legal directories where they have featured on the basis of their 
experience in competition law. The sample of UK solicitors and barristers was drawn from the 
                                                 
52
 3/HJUDQG³$JDLQVWD(XURSHDQ&LYLO&RGH´Modern Law Review 44. 
53
 Jurisdictions with low enforcement levels were not included because part of the point is that there are not 
many cases anywhere. (See Ashurst Report, supra n 4; Collective Redress in Antitrust, supra n 4.) Hence, there 
was a need to do the interviews in countries where the claimants are relatively active, assuming that, on the basis 
of their practical experience, legal practitioners (from jurisdictions with high enforcement levels) could have 
valuable insights to share with us.  
54
 6HH66DORSDQG/:KLWH³3ULYDWH$QWLWUXVW/LWLJDWLRQ$Q,QWURGXFWLRQDQG)UDPHZRUN´LQ/:KLWHHG
Private Antitrust Litigation, New Evidence, New Learning (MIT Press, 1988) 1, 23. Case No 1077/5/7/07: Order 
of the Competition Appeal Tribunal ± Withdrawn Claim ± $SULO6HHDOVR%5RGJHU³3ULYDWH
enforcement of competition law, the hidden story: competition litigation settlements in the United Kingdom, 
2000-´2008) 29 European Competition Law Review %5RGJHU³&RPSHWLWLRQODZOLWLJDWLRQLQWKH8.
courts: a study of all cases 2005-3DUW,´Global Competition Litigation Review 93; B Rodger, 
³&RPSHWLWLRQODZOLWLJDWLRQLQWKH8.FRXUWVDVWXG\of all cases 2005-3DUW,,´Global 
Competition Litigation Review 136. 
55
 ,WLVZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWµSULYDWHOLWLJDWLRQLVSDUWRIODUJHURYHUDOOV\VWHPFRQVLVWLQJRIIRXUGLVWLQFWSKDVHV
the business conduct of potential litigants, the suing decision of potential plaintiffs, the settlement offers of the 
litigants once a dispute has arisen, and the litigation strategies and expenditures of both parties if settlement 
FDQQRWEHUHDFKHG¶6DORSDQG:KLWHsupra n 54, 16. 
56
 )5L]]XWR³'RHVWKHEuropean Community have legal competence to harmonise national procedural rules 
JRYHUQLQJSULYDWHDFWLRQVIRUGDPDJHVIRULQIULQJHPHQWVRI(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\DQWLWUXVWUXOHV´Global 
Competition Litigation Review &RPSDUH)URPWKH%RDUG³7ZRVWHSs forward and one step back: 
KDUPRQL]LQJWKHXQKDUPRQL]DEOH´Legal Issues of Economic Integration 207-211. 
57
 See Article 81 TFEU. See also: P Beaumont and P McEleavy, Private International Law, Anton (3rd ed, 
SULI/W Green,  2011)  16-17. 
58
 WJ Goode and PK Hatt, Methods in Social Research (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1952)  214. 
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relevant sections of the Legal 50059 and Chambers and Partners.60 The sample of German 
lawyers was drawn from the relevant sections of JUVE Handbuch.61 From the European 
Commission, the sample was drawn from the relevant sections of the published personnel list. 
We included officials from the Legal Service within the European Commission as well as from 
both DG Competition62 and Justice,63 as the issues in the project concern both competition 
policy and cross-border civil justice. In England, this resulted in a list of 338 people working 
as European Commission officials or legal practitioners in the area of EU and competition law, 
and 192 individuals were randomly selected as potential participants. In Germany, the random 
selection resulted in a sample of the 35 most respected lawyers in the area of competition law 
selected as potential participants. Safeguards were observed to ensure the best possible data 
quality and compliance with good research practices and ethical norms.64 19 interviews 
involving 25 participants were conducted with legal practitioners in England and Wales, and 3 
interviews involving 3 participants were conducted with policy-makers in Brussels from March 
to September 2011. 11 interviews involving 17 participants were conducted with legal 
practitioners in Germany from September 2011 to August 2012.65 
                                                 
59
 Legal 500HGLWRULDORQ/RQGRQVROLFLWRUV¶(8DQG&RPSHWLWLRQSUDFWLFHDW
http://www.legal500.com/c/london/corporate-and-commercial/eu-and-competition (last visited 21 March 2012). 
60
 Chambers and Partners, list of London solicitors practicing in Competition/European Law at 
http://www.chambersandpartners.com/UK/Editorial/38977 (last visited 21 March 2012). 
61
 JUVE Handbuch Führende Namen im Kartellrecht at 
http://www.juve.de/handbuch/de/2011/fuehrendenamen/24250 (last visited 6 August 2012). 
62
 DG Comp personnel directory at 
http://ec.europa.eu/staffdir/plsql/gsys_www.branch?pLang=EN&pId=313&pDisplayAll=0 (last visited 21 March 
2012). 
63
 DG Justice personnel directory at 
http://ec.europa.eu/staffdir/plsql/gsys_www.branch?pLang=EN&pId=9151&pDisplayAll=0 (last visited 21 
March 2012). 
64
 Each potential participant was informed of the aims, methods, sources of funding and institutional affiliations 
RIWKHUHVHDUFKHUV3DUWLFLSDQWV¶LQformed consent was always sought before each interview; participants also 
signed a consent declaration. Participants were all over the age of 18 and engaged in a professional occupation, 
and were therefore in a position to decline a request for informed consent if they so wished. To ensure that 
participants could speak freely, they were also informed of the right to abstain from participation in the study or 
to withdraw consent to participate at any time without penalty. Every precaution was taken to respect and 
VDIHJXDUGWKHSULYDF\RIHDFKSDUWLFLSDQWDQGWKHFRQILGHQWLDOLW\RIHDFKSDUWLFLSDQW¶VLQIRUPDWLRQ$OOSHUVRQDO
information was rendered anonymous as far as is possible and consistent with the needs of the study, and as early 
as possible in the data processing. Even though several participants were employed by large law firms, they 
could be expected to provide a fair account because of this anonymity, and their professionalism. 
65
 Although some of the interviews involved more than one respondent, we decided that it would be only fair to 
count each interview as one case for data analysis purposes, although the separation of responses from different 
participants was always maintained. 
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In addition, the authors took account of the primary data available on the European 
Commission web site66 as well as of the recent comparative data disclosed in the study 
UHTXHVWHGE\WKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW¶V&RPPLWWHe on Economic and Monetary Affairs.67  
That said, it should be clearly noted that the so gathered empirical data will be only briefly 
presented in this paper with a view to producing a theoretical model, which does consider the 
choice of governance design of cross-border EU competition law actions by addressing the 
VSHFLILFLVVXHVWKDWDIIHFWWKHOLWLJDQWV¶VWUDWHJLHVAs a result, it is not the intention of this article 
to present the empirical data systematically as this has been  done in an edited collection of 
papers produced within the project framework,68 but it rather aims to consider the choice of 
governance design of cross-border EU competition law actions. 
 
C. GOVERNANCE ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER EU COMPETITION LAW LITIGATION: 
MAIN CHALLENGES FOR POLICY-MAKERS 
Before looking at the main issues which affect the suing decisions of potential litigants, the 
main challenges, which affect the governance aspects of cross-border competition litigation, 
will be presented. A difficult task for the EU policy-makers in the area of competition law 
(similarly, as the one for the EU69 itself) is the process of creation of a European enforcement 
UHJLPH³ZKLFKLVEDVHGRQWKHH[LVWLQJGLYHUVLW\RIPHPEHUVWDWHV´¶70 legal orders.  
The fact that the cause of action for EU competition law damages is a mixture of EU law 
DQG0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ODZVPD\EHMXVWLILHGE\WKH³SROLWLFDODQGOHJDOUHDOLW\´LQWKH8QLRQ71 
The latter aims to strike a balance between the requirement of consistent enforcement of EU 
FRPSHWLWLRQODZDFURVV(XURSHRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶FRPSHWHQFHLQPDWWHUV
of procedure broadly defined to cover the issues of causation and remedies, on the other hand.72 
                                                 
66
 See more: EUROPA ± European Commission ± &RPSHWLWLRQ³1DWLRQDO-XGJPHQWV´
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/antitrust/nationalcourts/ > (last accessed 10 June 2013). See also: S. 
Peyer, 'Myths and Untold Stories - Private Antitrust Enforcement in Germany' (2010) < 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1672695& > (last accessed 1 May 2012). 
67
 Collective Redress in Antitrust, supra n 4. 
68
 See more: Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2. 
69
 J Shaw, ´Postnational constitutionalism in the European Union´ (1999) Journal of European Public Policy 
579, 586. 
70
 Ibid. See more specifically: J Lawrence, ´6HHNLQJWKH3HUIHFW%DODQFH6RPH5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules´ in CD Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels (Hart Publishing, 2007) 457, 
460-476.   
71
 W Van Gerven, ³Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures´ (2000) Common Market Law Review 501, 521. 
72
 Ibid. 
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However, is such an approach not prone to undermine the consistent application of EU 
competition law across Europe? Should there be a special regime for cross-border EU 
competition law actions? What should be the new mode of governance in the area? 
1. A Non-PIL Mode of Governance: Harmonisation of Substantive/Procedure 
Laws 
One mode of governance would be more harmonisation (rather than the use of private 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLQVWUXPHQWVLQWKHDUHDZLWKDYLHZWRDFKLHYLQJ³DGHJUHHRIKDUPRQLVDWLRQ
RIIXQGDPHQWDOFRQFHSWVRIQDWLRQDOFLYLOODZERWKVXEVWDQWLYHDQGSURFHGXUDO´73 It is well 
established WKDWµ>W@KHSXUSRVHRI>%UXVVHOV,5RPe I and Rome II] is clearly the unification of 
private international law, not the harmonisation of the substantive laws of the Member States, 
RQZKLFKLWPD\EHPRUHGLIILFXOWWRUHDFKDJUHHPHQW¶74 However, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
forming part of each MHPEHU6WDWH¶VOHJDORUGHUDUHQRWRQO\KDUPRQLVHGEXWDOVRDWWKHKHDUW
of an EU competition law claim, so that the use of private international law in cross-border 
private antitrust proceedings may be questioned. Hence, a case for employing such a non-PIL 
mode of governance can certainly be PDGHIRUFDVHVZKHUH³FDUWHODJUHHPHQWVRUDEXVHVRID
dominant position affect inter-6WDWH FRPPHUFH´75 by pointing out that Articles 101 and 102 
7)(8IRUPLQJSDUWRIHDFK0HPEHU6WDWH¶VOHJDORUGHUDUHDOUHDG\unified.  
The German Government and Bundeskartellamt ³FDQQRWGLVFHUQDQ\FRQYLQFLQJUHDVRQ
for special private law and civil procedure rules for enforcing antitrust law. [...] Damages 
actions [...] are largely enforced on the basis of general provisions that are in many ways 
IXQGDPHQWDOO\ GLIIHUHQW LQ WKH YDULRXV 0HPEHU 6WDWHV´76 However, does the fact that EU 
competition law provisions are to be applied in a multi-level system of governance (which 
includes the European Commission, national competition authorities and national courts) not 
suggest that there is a need for a special legislative instrument to be used in this context? 
                                                 
73
 Ashurst Report, supra n 4, 131. 
74
 A Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (CUP, 2009) 185. See also Council of the 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQµ7KH+DJXH3URJUDPPHVWUHQJWKHQLQJIUHHGRPVHFXULW\DQGMXVWLFHLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf 31. 
75
 W Van Gerven, ³Bringing (private) laws closer to each other at the European level´ in F Cafaggi (ed.), The 
Institutional Framework of European Private Law (OUP, 2006) 37, 66. 
76
 Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the Federal Ministry of Justice, the Federal 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection and the Bundeskartellamt on the EU Commission's 
White Paper on 'Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules' (Courtesy Translation) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/bund_en.pdf > 3. See also J 
Kortmann and C Swaak, ´The EC White Paper on Antitrust Damage Actions: Why the Member States are (right 
to be) less than Enthusiastic´ (2009) European Competition Law Review 340 
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Indeed, the EU legislator has adopted a special Regulation 1/2003 which is meant to 
ensure that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are applied effectively and uniformly across Europe.77 
,W KDV EHHQ FOHDUO\ VWDWHG WKDW ³LQ RUGHU WR HQVXUH FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKH SULQFLSOHV RI OHJDO
certainty and the uniform application of the Community competition rules in a system of 
parallel powers, conflicting decisiRQVPXVWEHDYRLGHG´78 If EU competition law provisions are 
at the heart of an EU competition law claim, then a harmonised instrument might be used to lay 
down the conditions for bringing EU competition law damages actions across Europe. The 
European Commission¶V SURSRVHG'LUHFWLYH³PRGLILHVWKHDSSOLFDEOHQDWLRQDOUXOHVFRQFHUQLQJ
WKHULJKWWRFODLPGDPDJHVIRULQIULQJHPHQWVRI>«@FRPSHWLWLRQODZ´79 But, may the Union 
achieve harmonisation with regard to substantive and procedural rules with a view to setting up 
an effective enforcement regime? 
Some commentators have noted that a legal regime for EU competition law damages 
DFWLRQV DGRSWHGDW(8 OHYHOPD\SRWHQWLDOO\ LPSDFWRQ WKH³LQWHUQDO FRKHUHQFHRI >0HPEHU
6WDWHV¶ GRPHVWLF@ V\VWHPV RI SULYDWH DQG SURFHGXUDO ODZ´80 Moreover, the diverse legal 
traditions and heritages of the countries forming the European Union81 might suggest that the 
level of variation may remain unchanged after the adoption of such a harmonised regime in 
(XURSH7KLVLVVREHFDXVH³FRPPRQSULQFLSOHVRILQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGDFRPPRQOHJDOFXOWXUH´
take some time to develop.82 It seems that this could be an issue in a Union which has recently 
enlarged to encompass 28 Member States.  
More importantly, a harmonised instrument without an appropriate institutional structure 
might bring fresh uncertainty across Europe. It has been submitted that:  
³LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI D IHGHUDO FRXUW V\VWHP LW ZLOO QRW EH SRVVLEOH WR HQVXUH FRQVLVWHQW
interpretation, application and enforcement of [any harmonised instrument].  
All these problems of consistency and effectiveness are, of course, exacerbated by the fact that 
(XURSHLVPXOWLOLQJXDOWHUULWRU\´83  
 
                                                 
77
 See Recitals 1-8 of Council Regulation No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Arts 101 and 102 TFEU. 
78
 Recital 22 of Regulation 1/2003. 
79
 Explanatory Memorandum - Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions, 10. 
80
 Kortmann and Swaak, supra n 76, 347. 
81
 The delay may be a problem in some countries (e.g. Italy - Cooper Tire, supra  n 10, [54-55] EWCA). The 
lack of experience of the judiciary could be a problem in other countries (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania - eg 
&RPPLVVLRQ(&µ%XOJDULD¶VSURJUHVVRQDFFRPSDQ\LQJPHDVXUHVIROORZLQJ$FFHVVLRQ¶5HSRUW&20
ILQDO&RPPLVVLRQ(&µ5RPDQLD¶VSURJUHVVRQDFFRPSDQ\LQJPHDVXUHVIROORZLQJ$FFHVVLRQ¶5HSRUW
COM (2007) 378 final. See also: Reports on Progress in Bulgaria and Romania < 
http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm > (last visited 10 June 2013). 
82
 T Andersson, ´Approximation of procedural law in Europe´ in M Storme (ed), Procedural Laws in Europe 
(Maklu, 2003) 55, 64-65. 
83
 Collins, supra n 19, 183. 
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Furthermore, the study on Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU 
unequivocally indicates that exemplary damages84 as well as the various collective redress 
mechanisms (any opt-out rule in particular)85 that could be put into effect by legislative 
measures may result in significant harmonisation costs. It has been submitted by Kerber86 that 
³FROlective decision-making implies large costs such as knowledge, rent-seeking problems, 
LQHIILFLHQFLHVRULQIOH[LELOLW\´87 In other words, one might question the effectiveness of more 
centralisation in the area of private antitrust enforcement by devising another legislative 
instrument which is the result of a compromise reached at EU level. Indeed, the recently 
proposed Directive clearly suggests that adoption of a unified/cenrtalised system (which might 
include a unified/hierarchical enforcement regime) is not on the agenda for anyone. 
2. A PIL Mode of Governance: Inter-jurisdictional Regulatory Competition  
Another mode of governance may be promoting regulatory competition. Such a mode of 
governance pre-supposes two elements. First, common principles may be set up by the EU 
policy-makers with a view to encouraging the Member States to legislate. Secondly, an efficient 
PIL regime must ensure that there is inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition in the area of 
EU antitrust law dispute resolution which, by definition, would affect claimants and businesses 
in a number of Member States. Indeed, a set of harmonised private international law rules88 
have been consistently employed by the EU legislator as a mode of governance which promotes 
judicial cooperatLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH YDULRXV 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ OHJDO V\VWHPV89 The use of PIL 
mechanisms allows Member States to adopt different solutions. At the same time, claimants 
can show their preferences (by bringing their claim in one jurisdiction instead of another) 
promoting competition between legal orders, and fostering the learning process across 
Europe.90 6XFK D ³SHUVSHFWLYH ZRXOG GDPQ KDUPRQLVDWLRQ LWVHOI DV DQWL-FRPSHWLWLYH´91 
:HDWKHULOOKDVFODLPHGWKDW³LQDJHRJUDSKLFDOO\DQGIXQFWLRQDOO\H[SDQGHG(XURSHDQ8QLRQ
                                                 
84
 Report for the European Commission, Contract DG COMP/2006/A3/012, Making Antitrust Damages Actions 
More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf > p 236. 
85
 Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU, supra n 84, pp 311 and 316-317. 
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the establishment of common rules is not only increasingly difficult to achieve, it is also 
LQFUHDVLQJO\XQGHVLUDEOHDVDVXSSUHVVLRQRIFRPSHWLWLYHDQGFXOWXUDOGLYHUVLW\´92 What are the 
aspects, which must be considered in this context? Are any of them addressed by the recently 
proposed Directive?  
If the current litigation pattern suggests  WKDW³>W@KHREVWDFOHVDUHPDLQO\SURFHGXUDO´93, 
then one should say that procedural matters are best addressed at national level as the EU 
legislator¶V intervention in these matters would bring fresh uncertainty. Indeed, the point was 
clearly noted by the European Commission:  
³$'LUHFWLYHUHTXLUHV0HPEHU6WDWHVWRDFKLHYHWKHREMHFWLYHVDQGLPSOHPHQWWKHPHDVXUHVLQWR
their national substantive and procedural law systems. This approach gives the Member States 
more freedom when implementing an EU measure than does a Regulation, in that Member States 
are left the choice of the most appropriate means of implementing the measure in the Directive. 
This allows Member States to ensure that these new rules are consistent with their existing 
VXEVWDQWLYHDQGSURFHGXUDOIUDPHZRUN´94 
 
Hence, the Union policy-maker appears to believe that a national legislator may be best 
SODFHGWR³GHYLVHDQLQVWLWXWLRQDODUFKLWHFWXUHRIFRPSHWLWLRQlaw enforcement [at national level] 
which encourages the claims, where there is really harm to the market and the process of 
competition, and creates safeguards against claims where companies might be using the system 
for a variety of purposes not necessarily beneficial to the market and the process of 
FRPSHWLWLRQ´95 The impression that the issues are to be predominantly dealt with by national 
legislators across Europe is reinforced by the Commission Recommendation on collective 
redress which states: 
³7KHDim of this Recommendation is to facilitate access to justice in relation to violations of 
rights under Union law and to that end to recommend that all Member States should have 
collective redress systems at national level that follow the same basic principles throughout the 
Union, taking into account the legal traditions of the Member States and safeguarding against 
DEXVH´96  
 
Given the level of diversity across Europe, the Commission Recommendation and 
Directive may effectively encourage inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition in the area. 
However, it should be noted that a regulatory competition with regard to cross-border damages 
claims may be only promoted if injured parties can directly choose between damages regimes 
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of different jurisdictions and bring their claims there by benefitting from procedural/substantive 
laws of the jurisdiction where the claim is brought by relying on the law of the forum (lex fori).97  
The possibility for regulatory competition in Europe with regard to EU competition law 
damages claims was first signalled by the authors of the report Making Antitrust Damages 
Actions More Effective in the EU.98 Although the authors of the report appear to be placing a 
significant importance on the applicable laws under Rome II, Article 1(3) states that the 
Regulation does not apply to evidence and procedure. Establishing jurisdiction in one forum 
rather than another would be important in so far as this would indicate the set of procedural 
rules which should apply in this context.99 The significance of the law of the forum could be 
further strengthened by making reference to Art 6(3)(b) of Rome II which allows a private 
antitrust claimant to base his claim on lex fori in cases where the markets in several countries 
have been affected.100 It should be noted that when one talks about EU competition law actions, 
LWLVQRW³FRPSHWLWLRQEHWZHHQFRPSHWLWLRQODZV´101 (as suggested by the authors of the report 
Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU102), but, since Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU enjoy direct effect in all the Member States, it is rather promoting competition 
between the different jurisdictions for laying down conditions for bringing such actions. Such 
conditions might include, for example, the various rules related to the pre-trial discovery and 
the availability of opt-out collective redress proceedings and/or exemplary/punitive damages103 
as well as the speed of the legal proceedings and the experience of judges in the different 
jurisdictions. 
Given the diverse nature of the European Union, it seems that inter-jurisdictional 
regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust law dispute resolution may be best employed 
by the EU legislator as a new mode of governance which might produce efficient enforcement 
results in a multi-level system. In this way, strong jurisdictions for bringing cross-border EU 
competition law actions might emerge. An increased number of claims might be seen in some 
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Member States. But, what if there are market failures driven by externalities or lack of mobility 
of market participants?104 Externalities could be one cause for market failure when it comes to 
inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust law dispute resolution in 
the European context. It is well established that:  
µ:HDNHQIRUFement of antitrust rules [...] in one nation may have a negative impact on the profits 
of foreign based producers whose products are thereby squeezed out of the market. To the extent 
that these spillover effects are not based on market-clearing effects, but rather driven by strategic 
behaviour, suboptimal results must be antiticipated. To avoid welfare losses and market 
distortions, such externalities must be corrected through some form of interjurisdictional 
FROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ¶105 
  
Hence, in addition to the proposed Directive, the EU intervention, on the basis of Article 
81 TFEU, might be required as the cross-border implications of many EU competition law 
actions would make any national legislation less than effective in the EU context.106 In 
particular, the inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition market would fail to address the 
current enforcement gap if there are high cross-border litigation costs and lack of information 
as to the various rules across Europe, and if there is no mobility of the consumers and SMEs, 
who have suffered damages as a result of an EU competition law infringement.107 If these issues 
are not addressed, then the inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition would lead to economic 
externalities - giving rise to welfare losses and market distortions108 - across Europe unless the 
EU legislator implements a new mode of governance, which pre-supposes an effective private 
international law regime, with a view to allowing for Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to be 
efficiently enforced across Europe.  
KHUEHU DQG %XG]LQVNL KDYH SXW IRUZDUG WKDW ³>W@KH ZRUNLQJ SURSHUWLHV RI UHJXODWRU\
competition seem to depend crucially on specific preconditions, the institutional framework for 
UHJXODWRU\FRPSHWLWLRQDQGWKHNLQGRIOHJDOUXOHVDQGUHJXODWLRQVLWVHOI´109 Whilst, the private 
international law framework (and its clarity) will certainly have an important role to play when 
it comes to selecting where to litigate (or even whether to litigate at all), the cross-border 
litigation costs may affect the mobility of the injured parties (or at least some of the injured 
parties). These costs/risks could be multiplied if the institutional framework is allowing for 
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SDUDOOHOSURFHHGLQJVZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH VDPH LQIULQJHPHQWDQGRU LI WKH UHJXODWRU¶VGHFLVLRQ
establishing an infringement is not really useful in a subsequent follow-on damages claim. 
Can the policy-makers achieve a level of managed harmonisation (setting up common 
principles and minimum standards) by relying on an effectively functioning private 
international law regime? AQDQDO\VLVRIWKHOLWLJDQWV¶VWUDWHJLHVPLJKWEHXVHIXOLQLGHQWLI\LQJ 
what the appropriate mode of governance is as well as in indicating the course of the potential 
reform. How does the current mode of governance VKDSHWKHOLWLJDQWV¶VWUDWHJLes? What are the 
main issues which affect the suing decisions of potential litigants?  
 
D. THE CURRENT MODE OF GOVERNANCE: ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED 
As the current regime appears to be shaping litigants strategies, in this section, a brief summary 
will be provided of the qualitative interview data110 which may be indicative as to the important 
LVVXHVZKLFKDSSHDUWREHDIIHFWLQJDQGVKDSLQJWKHOLWLJDQWV¶WDFWLFVXQGHUWKHFXUUHQWUHJLPH
An analysis of the current mode of governance of cross-border EU litigation appears to suggest 
that there are three main aspects which are seemingly important for the policy-makers to 
consider with a YLHZWRSURYLGLQJIRUWKH³HIIHFWLYHHQIRUFHPHQWRI(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZ´111 
First, the problems surrounding two-step adjudication structure, in which arguably a regulator 
is better placed to detect and establish an infringement and, subsequently, a court is better 
placed to award damages,112 should be identified under the current competition law 
enforcement regime. Secondly, the problems surrounding the jurisdictional differences and 
OLWLJDQWV¶ VWUDWHJLHV PXVW EH FRQVLGHUHG 7KLUGO\ WKH VSHFLILF SUREOHPV UHJDUGLQJ FRQVXPHU
claims must be considered with a view to close the enforcement gap in Europe. 
 
1. The Enforcement Pattern and LǯStrategies in the EU Context  
In the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposed Directive for antitrust damages 
DFWLRQV WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ KDV QRWHG WKDW ³>W@KH RYHUDOO HQIRUFHPHQW RI WKH (8
competition rules is best guaranteed through complementary public and private enforcement. 
However, the existing legal framework does not properly regulate the interaction between the 
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WZRVWUDQGVRI(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZHQIRUFHPHQW´113 How does the current enforcement pattern 
DIIHFWOLWLJDQWV¶Vtrategies?  
In an analysis of the current institutional architecture of EU competition law enforcement, 
Wils has noted:  
³SXEOLFDQWLWUXVWHQIRUFHPHQWLVWKHVXSHULRULQVWUXPHQWWRSXUVXHWKHREMHFWLYHVRIFODULILFDWLRQ
and development of the law and of deterrence and punishment, whereas private actions for 
damages are superior for the pursuit of corrective justice through compensation, then the optimal 
antitrust enforcement would appear to be a system in which public antitrust enforcement aims at 
clarification and development of the law and at deterrence and punishment, while private actions 
IRUGDPDJHVDLPDWFRPSHQVDWLRQ´114  
 
Such a two-step adjudication process, which according to Wils115 appears to be also 
adopted in the White Paper for damages,116 would give rise to several problems in a cross-
border context in Europe. In particular, the antitrust authorities across Europe would not have 
the resources to detect and pursue all EU competition law infringements, and, as a result, there 
may be an enforcement gap as the private litigation would follow-RQWKHUHJXODWRU¶VGHFLVLRQ 
That said, one might object to that by saying that there is no two-step adjudication model 
explicitly (or deliberately) devised by policy-makers in so far as Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
have direct effect, and as a result the courts may well establish an infringement and award 
GDPDJHV+HQFHWKHUHPD\EHDQHHGWRFRQVLGHUWKHOLWLJDQWV¶VWUDWHJLHVZKLFKPD\LQGLFDWH
as to what is the prevailing enforcement pattern at present.    
Although, the qualitative interview data appear to suggest that competition litigation is 
picking up in England as well as in Germany, a closer look at the collected data shows that the 
majority of the participants are of the view that the increase is only in respect of follow-on 
actions. This view re-appeared despite the fact that the interview questions were broadly drafted 
and there were no questions which were asking the participants whether the increase is in 
respect of follow-on or standalone actions. Despite this, the respondents from England and 
Brussels clearly stated on 13 occasions that the follow-on actions are the ones picking up;117 so 
too was stated by four respondents from Germany.118 The impression is reinforced by the most 
recent English case law119 which clearly underlines that the private competition law claims are 
preceded by a finding of an infringement by a regulator. 
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The prevalent strategy employed by injured parties clearly indicates that the current 
enforcement pattern is characterised by a two-step adjudication. It should be noted that the 
respondents were asked if a person, who is adversely affected by an infringement, would launch 
a complaint with a competition authority or whether he would rather bring a private action and 
seek damages before national courts. It appears that the majority of the participants expresses 
the view that going to the competition authority first would be a normal strategy. This view was 
expressed on 14 occasions in England,120 and on eight occasions in Germany.121 Indeed, one 
respondent from Germany observed that ³>«@VWDUWLQJDFLYLOODZSURFHHGLQJZLWKRXWDQ\FOHDU
GHFLVLRQE\DQ\FRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULW\LVDOPRVWLPSRVVLEOH´This participant even stated he has 
never been involved in a stand-alone action. Only one participant from Germany was not 
FRQYLQFHGWKDWLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRZDLWIRUDFRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULW\¶VGHFLVLRQDV³>«@\RXQHHG
WRJRWRWKHFRXUWDQ\ZD\´. But the same respondent backtracked later on and emphasised that 
he³>«@ZRXOGFHUWDLQO\QRWDGYLVHDFOLHQWWRfile a stand-alone lawsuit with respect to hard 
core cartels´ 
Therefore, there is clearly a two-step adjudication, in which arguably a regulator is better 
placed to detect and establish an infringement and, subsequently, a court is better placed to 
award damages.122 The current enforcement pattern affects litigants¶ tactics in a number of 
ways. First, the private litigation which occurs normally proceeds as a follow-on action based 
on a public enforcement action. Secondly, the defendants appear to be employing a number of 
delaying strategies raising preliminary issues in the course of private antitrust proceedings. If 
the two-step adjudication model is not functioning efficiently, then there would be a level of 
legal uncertainty and evidential hurdles which could be due to the institutional design.  
The Commission Work Programme 2012123 has identified that the interrelationship 
between private enforcement and public enforcement is an important area where a legislative 
measure would be needed.124 In the Explanatory Memorandum of the proposal for a Directive 
on antitrust damages actions, the European Commission has recently noted that: 
³There is a significant risk that effective public enforcement by the Commission and NCAs 
would be jeopardised in the absence of EU-wide regulation of the interaction between public and 
private enforcement, and in particular of a common European rule on information from the file 
RIDFRPSHWLWLRQDXWKRULW\EHLQJDYDLODEOHIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIDGDPDJHDFWLRQ´125  
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The Court of Justice decisions in Pfleiderer126 and its subsequent application by the 
German court in Pfleiderer127 and by the English court in National Grid128 clearly show that 
there was a level of uncertainty as to whether all the evidence collected by a regulator is 
accessible to injured parties in support of their private damage claims. Moreover, Enron Coal 
Services Ltd (In Liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Ltd129 does suggest that it may be 
questionable whether the majority of evidence, which has been collected by the regulator, 
would be of great value in private proceedings.130  Indeed, the decision of the English Court of 
Appeal indicates that, even in a follow-on action, an injured party does face numerous evidential 
hurdles. As Lord Justice Jacob QRWHG ³WKH µVSOLW¶ MXULVGLFWLRQRI UHJXODWRU IRU LQIULQJHPHQW
WULEXQDO IRU FDXVDWLRQ DQGDVVHVVPHQWRIGDPDJHV DOVRQHHGV VRPH UHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ´131 The 
problems would be multiplied in a cross-border context as the need for taking evidence by a 
competition authority located in one Member State may be needed with a view to supporting 
private competition law proceedings taking place in another Member State.132  
In view of the foregoing, the Damages Actions Initiative may be seen as an opportunity 
for the EU legislator to look at the current two-step adjudication enforcement structure, and its 
cross-border implications. It should be noted that Recital 25 of the Proposed Directive moves 
in this direction by stating that: 
³7RHQKDQFHOHJDOFHUWDLQW\WRDYRLGLQFRQVistency in the application of those Treaty provisions, 
to increase the effectiveness and procedural efficiency of actions for damages and to foster the 
IXQFWLRQLQJRIWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHWIRUXQGHUWDNLQJVDQGFRQVXPHUVLWVKRXOG>«@QRWEHSRVVLEOH
to call into question a final decision by a national competition authority or a review court finding 
an infringement of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty in actions for damages relating to the same 
infringement, regardless of whether or not the action is brought in the Member State of the 
DXWKRULW\RUUHYLHZFRXUW´133  
 
However, there are several outstanding issues which might need to be carefully addressed. 
First, problems are bound to arise with regard to public antitrust enforcement proceedings 
                                                 
126
 Pfleiderer, supra n 7. 
127
 In the Pfleiderer case, "the German court ruled against disclosure of leniency documents". The High Court 
referred to the judgment of the Amstgericht Bonn of 30 January 2012 in the Pfleiderer case. See National Grid, 
supra n 10, [60]. 
128
 National Grid, supra n 10, [56 ± 60]. 
129
 Enron Coal Services Ltd (In Liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 2. 
130
 See more: KPE Lasok, ´Some Procedural Aspects and How They Could/Should be Reformed´ in Danov, 
Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 207-214; J Webber, ´Observations on the Implications of Pfleiderer for 
Leniency Programmes´ in Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 215-222. See more: Section E, infra. 
131
 Enron, supra n 129, [149]. 
132
 6HH0'DQRY³(8&RPSHWLWLRQ/DZ(QIRUFHPHQW,V%UXVVHOV,VXLWHGWRGHDOLQJZLWKDOOWKHFKDOOHQJHV"´
(2012)  61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 27. 
133
 Recital 25 of the Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions. See also: Art 9 of the Proposed 
Directive. Compare the current framework: Arts 11±14 of Council Regulation 1/2003. See more: S Brammer, 
Co-operation Between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC Competition Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2009). 
22 
 
before an NCA located in one Member State and parallel private proceedings related to the 
same breaches of Article 101 TFEU and/or Article 102 TFEU before a court in another Member 
State. Secondly, a recent comparative study134 appears to suggest that an important question, in 
a cross-border context, is whether a Member State court is entitled to refuse the recognition of 
a decision taken by a foreign national competition authority that does not respect due process 
rules in its adoption.135 While a national court would apply civil procedure rules that presuppose 
respect of due process, an NCA would apply administrative procedure rules that could 
SRWHQWLDOO\UDLVHFRQFHUQVDVWRWKHXQGHUWDNLQJ¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDODQGKHDULQJ136  
Thirdly, even if the regulator had respected the due process rules in the adoption of its 
decision, the two-step adjudication process would create specific problems when it comes to 
imposing personal liability for EU competition law infringements in a cross-border context. In 
particular, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are meant to prevent anti-FRPSHWLWLYH ³DFWLYLties of 
XQGHUWDNLQJV´137 However, the concept of undertaking used by the regulator when establishing 
an infringement, and the fact that most multinational businesses would involve not a single 
legal entity, but groups of companies, suggests that there are specific problems which must be 
DGGUHVVHGZLWKUHJDUGWRSULYDWHSURFHHGLQJV,QSDUWLFXODUZKLOVW³DUHEXWWDEOHSUHVXPSWLRQ
that the parent company does in fact exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of its 
VXEVLGLDU\´138 would allow the Commission to impose fines on the ultimate parent company, 
SUREOHPVZRXOGEHERXQGWRDULVHLQSULYDWHSURFHHGLQJVDVLWPD\EHIDUIURPFOHDU³ZKLFK
legal entities within a corporate group are liable for an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU 
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DQG WR ZKDW H[WHQW´139 The following questions would be key elements in a cross-border 
context: Can an injured party sue in England a local subsidiary that is not named in the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGHFLVLRQ":LOOWKHUHEHDELQGLQJILQGLQJWKDWWKHUHLVDQLQIULQJHPHQWE\DORFDO
subsidiary that is a part of a group of companies which was found to be one infringing 
undertaking within the meaning of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU? Would such an action be a 
stand-alone action or a follow-on action? These are not academic questions, but very practical 
ones, which have been subject to heated debates before the English courts.140 In particular, some 
of these issues were considered by the CAT in Emerson. In this case, the injured parties brought 
a cross-border EU competition law action against Carbone GB and several other defendants 
including Carbone SA. The claim was preceded by a decision of the European Commission 
establishing a single and continuous infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU.141 As a result, the 
Commission imposed fines on a number of legal entities, including Carbone SA. However, 
Carbone GB was not mentioned at all in the operative part of the Commission decision which 
raised the question whether the finding that the parent company, Carbone SA, has infringed EU 
competition law is binding on the subsidiary, Carbone GB, so that it can be imputed with 
liability.142 Most recently, Emerson Electric Co, Valeo SA, Robert Bosch CmBH as claimants 
settled with the defendants, Morgan Crucible Company Plc, Schunk GmBH, Schunk 
Kohlenstofftechnik GmBH, SGL Carbon SE, Mersen SA and Mersen UK Portslade Ltd, so that 
a level of uncertainty will remain in the area. That said, the Emerson litigation illustrates well 
how the current enforcement pattern and the existing OHYHORIXQFHUWDLQW\GRVKDSHOLWLJDQWV¶
strategies in a cross-border context in so far as the confidential settlement in question was 
reached, after the parties had been engaged in competition law proceedings for more than six 
years.143 
Furthermore, Toshiba Carrier and others v KME Yorkshire and others144 may be seen as 
yet another example which suggests that specific jurisdiction issues arise in follow-on actions 
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against subsidiaries that were not mentioned in the operative part of the Commission decision. 
In other words, any mode of governance must inter alia take account of the cross-border aspects 
of EU competition law infringements with a view to setting up an efficient enforcement regime. 
Indeed, the governance aspects of cross-border EU competition law enforcement activities 
would be important in view of the important jurisdictional differences which would be 
perceived as important by litigants in a cross-border context. 
 
2. Jurisdictional Differences and LǯStrategies in the EU Context  
Given the importance of the law of procedure for the litigants in EU competition law claims, 
the authors were particularly interested in the existence of procedural advantages for a claimant 
to bring his EU competition law action in one Member State rather than another. The issues are 
seemingly important in the light of the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the recent 
Proposal for a Directive for Antitrust Damage Actions, in which the drafters have stated that:  
³%HFDXVHRIWK>H@PDUNHGGLYHUVLW\RIQDWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQVWKHUXOHVDSSOLFDEOHLQVRPH0HPEHU
States are considered by claimants to be much more suitable for bringing an antitrust damages 
action in those Member States rather than in others. These differences lead to inequalities and 
uncertainty concerning the conditions under which injured parties, both citizens and businesses, 
can exercise the right to compensation they derive from the Treaty, and effect the effectiveness 
of such right. Indeed, where the jurisdictional rules allow a claimant to bring its action in one of 
WKRVH µIDYRXUDEOH¶ 0HPEHU 6WDtes and where that claimant has the necessary resources and 
incentives to do so, it is thus far more likely to effectively exercise its EU right to compensation 
WKDQZKHQLWFDQQRWGRVR´145 
  
The law of the forum of the country where the action is brought may play an important 
role because, as noted elsewhere,146 WKHTXHVWLRQµZKHWKHUFHUWDLQHYLGHQFHSURYHVDFHUWDLQ fact 
«LVWREHGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHODZRIWKHFRXQWU\ZKHUHWKHTXHVWLRQDULVHV¶147 The answer to 
this question in many cases would be pre-determined by establishing jurisdiction in the injured 
party¶Vpreferred forum.148 Although Regulation 1/2003 stipulates that the burden of proving 
an infringement of Arts 101(1) and 102 TFEU rests on the party or the authority alleging the 
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Werke group). This led to delay and heated debates while the court decided if it had jurisdiction to hear and 
determine the action.  
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infringement,149 it does not set the standard of proof.150 In fact, Recital 5 of the Regulation states 
that: 
³WKLV 5HJXODWLRQ DIIHFWV QHLWKHU QDWLRQDO UXOHV RQ WKH VWDQGDUG RI SURRI QRU REOLJDWLRQV RI
competition authorities and courts of the Member States to ascertain the relevant facts of a case, 
SURYLGHGWKDWVXFKUXOHVDQGREOLJDWLRQVDUHFRPSDWLEOHZLWKJHQHUDOSULQFLSOHVRI>(8@ODZ´ 
 
This text could be interpreted as leaving the domestic legal system of each Member State 
WRGHWHUPLQHZKDWWKHµUHTXLUHGOHJDOVWDQGDUG¶RISURRILV151 In other words, the standard of 
proof is to be determined by the law of the court where proceedings have been brought.152 The 
answer to the question whether jurisdiction variations make a difference for an injured party 
bringing a cross-border EU competition law claim brought in an enlarged Europe was important 
in so far as it has been noted that ³the age-old gap between the procedural families in Europe, 
especially the gap between the Civil Law and Common Law countries, has been reduced in 
size.´153  
The gathered data clearly illustrates that procedural differences matter with regard to 
cross-border EU competition law actions brought in the European context. In particular, as 
already noted, 29 respondents from England and Germany thought that injured parties could 
gain some procedural (and/or substantive law) advantages by bringing their claim in one 
jurisdiction rather than another.154 This finds support in the case law155 which clearly shows 
that issue of jurisdiction could be a subject of heated debates before the courts.156 The most 
important procedural aspects can be summarised as: disclosure; speed of proceedings; and 
standard of proof. In particular, on 17 occasions in England and on 11 occasions in Germany, 
the disclosure rules were mentioned as a very important procedural aspect which could 
LQIOXHQFHDFODLPDQW¶VGHFLVLRQZKHUHWREULQJDQ(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZDFWLRQ7KHODWWHUSRLQW
PD\EHVWUHQJWKHQHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDW³WKHODFNRIDGHTXDWHUXOHVRQWKH
disclosure of documenWV>«@PHDQVWKDW>SRWHQWLDOFODLPDQWVPD\@KDYHQRHIIHFWLYHDFFHVVWR
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HYLGHQFH´157 in some Member States. Also, the speed of the procedure (i.e. the time it takes for 
an award to be made, or for an injured party to force a settlement) was considered to be an 
important factor; this was submitted on 15 occasions (12 occasions in England and 3 occasions 
in Germany). Thirdly, the standard of proof was mentioned as a decisive factor by one 
participant from Germany, and as an important factor by one participant in England as well. 
In view of the foregoing, one should say that the relative importance of the procedural 
rules reinforces the suggestion that a national legislator is best placed to address the problems. 
This could even allow for regulatory competition as it would be always open for the injured 
parties to bring their actions in the "jurisdiction judged most hospitable"158 on the basis of 
jurisdictional rules under Brussels I.159 However, this would be subject to the injured parties 
being able and being prepared to pay the cross-border litigation costs160 which could, of course, 
be offset against a potential damages award.  
The interview data clearly demonstrates that costs and damages would be other important 
factors to be considered in the European context. This is indeed submitted on 20 occasions in 
England and on eleven occasions in Germany, and is in line with literature suggesting that 
estimated damages are an important consideration.161 Although data from England appears to 
suggest that damages would be dominated by procedure which would pre-determine what and 
when would be awarded,162 the majority of respondents from England and Germany clearly 
state that availability of a passing-on defence would be an important consideration in a 
European context. The issue iVLQGHHGLPSRUWDQWLQYLHZRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VVXEPLVVLRQWKDW
YDULRXV³QDWLRQDOUXOHVRQSDVVLQJ-on (where existing differences have major implications for 
the ability of direct/indirect purchasers to effectively claim damages and, in turn, for the 
defendDQW¶V FKDQFHVRI DYRLGLQJFRPSHQVDWLRQ IRUKDUPFDXVHG´163 may be regarded as an 
example of divergence which justifies legislative intervention at EU level.  
It should be noted that all interview respondents from Germany stated that costs are an 
important issue to bear in mind when deciding where to bring a cross-border competition law 
claim as a cost-benefit analysis is the basic principle which shows whether an action is 
economically attractive. On 12 occasions in England, it was submitted that competition law 
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litigation is expensive. Costs can be very high in all litigation,164 but may be especially high in 
competition law claims165 where defendant companies tend to employ very expensive law 
firms, and where economic experts are frequently employed at considerable expense.166 The 
litigation costs could be further increased if the defendants employ delaying strategies which 
are attractive in the current state of uncertainty with regard to cross-border EU competition law 
actions.167 In Germany, on five out of eleven occasions, it was clearly stated that delaying is a 
strategy which can be employed by members of an infringing undertaking in a cross-border EU 
competition law action. In England, on 15 occasions, it has been submitted that delaying would 
be quite a common strategy to be employed by a defendant. However, not all preliminary 
matters raised by the defence are abusive: five participants from England noted that preliminary 
matters are often raised simply because liability, and therefore damages, often hinge on a 
preliminary matter.168  
That said, the way the current legislative framework VKDSHVWKHOLWLJDQWV¶VWUDWHJLHVPD\
be further illustrated by the series of jurisdictional challenges169 in follow-on actions before the 
English courts. A good example is the recent judgment of the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal 
in Deutsche Bahn AG v Morgan.170 In this case, the claim was initiated in December 2010. 
Deutsche Bahn (and 29 other claimants) brought damage claims against Morgan (and 5 other 
defendants). The claim was preceded by a decision of the European Commission finding an 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU.171 The cross-border nature of the claims can be easily 
suVWDLQHGE\SXWWLQJIRUZDUGWKDWRQWKHFODLPDQW¶VVLGH there were originally 12 claimants 
established in Germany, six claimants from England,172 five claimants from the Netherlands, 
two claimants from Portugal, two claimants from Italy, two from Sweden, one from Spain, and 
RQHIURP1RUZD\RQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVLGHWKHUHZHUHWKUHHGHfendants from Germany, one from 
                                                 
164
 See C HodgHV07XOLEDFNDDQG69RJHQDXHU³7KH2[IRUG6WXG\RQ&RVWVDQG)XQGLQJRI&LYLO/LWLJDWLRQ´
in C Hodges, M Tulibacka and S Vogenauer (eds.), The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation (Hart Publishing, 
2010) 3.  
165
 Case No: 1178/5/7/11, 2 Travel Group PLC (In Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited. 
[2011] CAT 30, 14 October 2011 [17]. See also: Yeheshkel Arkin v Borchard Lines and Others [2005] EWCA 
Civ 655 
166
 Danov and Dnes, supra n 8. 
167
 e.g. jurisdictional challenges - Provimi, supra n 7; Cooper Tire, supra  n 10; leniency documents: Pfleiderer, 
supra n 7; National Grid, supra n 10. 
168
 Danov and Dnes, supra n 8. 
169
 Provimi, supra n 7; Cooper Tire, supra  n 10; Toshiba Carrier, supra  n 10; National Grid, supra n 10; 
Nokia, supra n 10.  
170
 Deutsche Bahn AG v Morgan [2013] CAT 18, 15 August 2013. 
171
 Case C.38.359 ± Electrical and Mechanical Carbon and Graphite Products [2004] OJ L125/45. 
172
 Subsequently, by an order dated 19th April 2011, the CAT gave permission to one of the UK claimants to 
withdraw its claim. 
28 
 
the UK, one from Austria and one from France.173 In the circumstances, the claim was brought 
under Article 6(1) of Brussels I, which is specifically designed for multi-defendant cases. It 
states that: 
 ³a person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued[,] where he is one of a number of 
defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims 
are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk 
RILUUHFRQFLODEOHMXGJPHQWVUHVXOWLQJIURPVHSDUDWHSURFHHGLQJV´ 
 
The rationale of Article 6(1) is to centralise litigation against all defendants in one 
Member State and avoid the risk of (potentially) irreconcilable judgments if the different actions 
were brought in different Member States. Since the EU competition law infringements in 
Deutsche Bahn AG v Morgan caused damages to claimants in a number of Member States, 
Article 5(3) of Brussels I was not originally pleaded as a basis for jurisdiction. The injured 
SDUWLHV¶strategy may be explained by the fact that it is well established by the English High 
&RXUWWKDWµ>W@KHMXULVGLFWLRQEDVHGXSRQWKHSODFHRIWKHKDUPIXOHYHQWZLOOEHLQWHUQDWLRQDl, 
ZKLOHWKHMXULVGLFWLRQEDVHGXSRQWKHUHOHYDQWKDUPZLOOEHUHVWULFWHGWR(QJODQGDQG:DOHV¶174 
In other words, the courts in England as being the place where damage was felt would only 
have jurisdiction for the damage that occurred here, and they would not have jurisdiction to 
award damages to the injured parties for the damage they had suffered in other Member States. 
The narrow interpretation of Article 5(3) leaves no doubt that ³WKHFODLPDQWVDLPHGIRUD8QLWHG
Kingdom jurisdiction against all defendaQWV´175 under Article 6(1) of Brussels I.  
However, to rely on Article 6(1) an injured party KDVWRHVWDEOLVKD³JRRGDUJXDEOHFDVH´
that the English court has jurisdiction, and that the requirements of Article 6(1) Brussels I have 
been satisfied.176 To this eQGLWPXVWEHVKRZQWKDW³WKHUHLVDUHDOLVVXHEHWZHHQWKH&ODLPDQWV
DQGRQHRIWKH$QFKRU'HIHQGDQWVWKDWLVDQLVVXHZKLFKFDQQRWEHVWUXFNRXW´177 In Deutsche 
Bahn AG v Morgan, there was only one UK defendant, Morgan. Morgan defeated the FODLPDQWV¶
sWUDWHJ\WRFHQWUDOLVHOLWLJDWLRQLQWKH8.E\EULQJLQJDQ³DSSOLFDWLRQWRKDYHWKHFODLPDJDLQVW
LW VWUXFNRXWRQ WKHJURXQG WKDW LWKDVEHHQEURXJKWRXWRI WLPH´178 The application, which 
succeeded before the Competition Appeal Tribunal,179 was subsequently rejected by the English 
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Court of Appeal.180 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court granted to Morgan a permission to appeal 
against the decision of the Court of Appeal.181 
In the circumstances, the UK claimants had to change their tactics. In particular, they 
sought from the Competition Appeal Tribunal to lift the stay to their claims against the other 
five defendants.182 They had to base their damage claims on Article 5(3) of Brussels I rather 
than Article 6(1). 7KH8.FODLPDQWV¶DSSOLFDWLRQIRUDOLPLted lifting of the stay was granted.183 
,Q WKLV FRQWH[W WKH &$7 KHOG WKDW ³>M@XULVGLFWLRQ LV VXSSRVHG WR EH GHWHUPLQHG VZLIWO\ DQG
HIILFLHQWO\ DW WKH RXWVHW RI SURFHHGLQJV >«@´184 With this in mind, one should say that the 
growing number of jurisdiction challenges before the UK courts does suggest that there are 
some important issues with respect to governance aspects of cross-border EU competition law 
claims which must be addressed head-on by the EU policy-makers. 
 
 
3. Specific Aspects in Relation to Consumer Claims  
The high costs, which could be fuelled by the high level of uncertainty in cross-border EU 
competition law proceedings,185 may potentially deter claims brought by consumers and SMEs 
in so far as litigation costs/risks are important factors to be considered in claims brought by 
consumers and SMEs who may be prone to economise (unless they have a funding scheme in 
place) on the costs by bringing claims in their home states.186 Six out of 11 interviewees from 
Germany thought that it would be beneficial for plaintiffs to sue in their home state. Many 
participants from England made a clear distinction between claims brought by consumers and 
SMEs, on the one hand, and claims brought by big companies, on the other hand. On nine 
occasions in England, it was submitted that it would be beneficial especially for SMEs or 
consumers to sue in their home states. The point was clearly outlined by the European 
Commission which has recently stated that:  
³$VLQMXUHGSDUWLHVZLWKVPDOOHUFODLPVDQGRUIHZHUUHVRXUFHVWHQGWRFKRRVHWKHIRUXPRIWKHLU
Member State of establishment to claim damages (one reason being that consumers and smaller 
businesses in particular cannot afford to choose a more favourable jurisdiction), the result of the 
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discrepancies between national rules may be uneven playing field as regards actions for damages 
DQGPD\DIIHFWFRPSHWLWLRQRQWKHPDUNHWVLQZKLFKWKHVHLQMXUHGSDUWLHVRSHUDWH´187  
 
Thus, the low mobility of consumers and SMEs suggest that an enforcement gap may 
remain in some Member States unless there is a legislative reform at EU level. Danov, 
Fairgrieve and Howells188 have demonstrated some specific features of the collective redress 
antitrust damages actions by examining two litigation patterns as displayed in Emerald Supplies 
v British Airways189 and In Re International Air Transportation Surcharge Antitrust 
Litigation.190 They have noted that there are three important issues which need to be carefully 
considered by the policy-makers with a view to closing the enforcement gap. First, the fact that 
there would be multiple victims of EU competition law infringements in various countries is an 
important issue which needs to be carefully considered. Secondly, the numerous victims would 
have suffered different levels of damages, and, as a result, they may have different interests in 
so far as those affected by an EU competition law infringement may be up or down in the chain 
of distribution (i.e. passing on or absorbing the inflated price). Thirdly, consumers, who would 
normally absorb the loss, would be reluctant to bring such actions due to the negligible amount 
of damages suffered by them in comparison with the high litigation costs.191 The difficulties 
have been clearly QRWHGLQ5HFLWDORIWKH3URSRVHG'LUHFWLYHZKLFKDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDW³LW
may be particularly difficult for consumers or undertakings that did not themselves make any 
SXUFKDVHIURPWKHLQIULQJLQJXQGHUWDNLQJWRSURYHWKHVFRSHRIWKDWKDUP´192  
Thus, there is certainly a case for reform. In particular, given that most EU competition 
law infringements are cross-border in nature (affecting consumers and businesses in a number 
of Member States), one could convincingly argue that that evidential hurdles and issues of 
binding effect of administrative decisions adopted at national level must be carefully considered 
by policy-makers along with the issues of OLWLJDQWV¶ PRELOLW\ DQG the possibility for 
irreconcilable judgments/decisions across jurisdictions. 
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E. THE NEW MODE: GOVERNANCE ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER EU COMPETITION 
LAW ACTIONS IN EUROPE 
How should the Union exercise its competence? Art 5 TEU defines the limits of Union 
competences, and lays down the principles which should be used by the EU legislator when 
deciding how to exercise its competence.193 The Explanatory Memorandum specifies that:  
³>WKHSURSRVHG'LUHFWLYH@LVEDVHGRQERWK$UWLFOHVDQGRIWKH7UHDW\EHFDXVHLWSXUVXHV
two equally important goals which are inextricably linked, namely (a) to give effect to the 
principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty and (b) to ensure a more level playing 
field for undertakings operating in the internal market, and to make it easier for citizens and 
businesses to make use of the rights they derLYHIURPWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHW´194  
 
However, given the cross-border implication of most EU competition law infringements, 
which would affect consumers and businesses in a number of Member States, the policy-makers 
should consider whether Article 81 TFEU, which confers the EU competence in all private 
international law matters with a cross-border element,195  should not be used as an appropriate 
legislative basis for other legislative measures aiming to promote regulatory competition in the 
area of EU antitrust damages claims. The significant majority of our respondents are against a 
reform at EU level and in favour of a system of regulatory competition between procedural and 
substantive law regimes. In other words, the respondents appear to favour inter-jurisdictional 
regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust law dispute resolution to attract claimants and 
produce HIILFLHQWHQIRUFHPHQWUHVXOWV,WLVZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGWKDW³>L@QWKHDEVHQFHRIFHQWUDOO\
drafted uniform rules, free movement enables regulatRU\FRPSHWLWLRQEHWZHHQOHJDORUGHUV´196 
In view of that, one would have thought that the best way forward may be for the Union to 
encourage Member States to legislate on antitrust dispute resolution.197 This also appears to be 
the spirit of the Proposed Directive in so far as it leaves the Member States a level of flexibility 
ZLWK D YLHZ WR LPSOHPHQWLQJ WKH SURSRVHG PHDVXUHV ³ZKLOH OHDYLQJ URRP IRU LQGLYLGXDO
0HPEHU6WDWHVWRJRIXUWKHUVKRXOGWKH\ZLVKVR´198 
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+RZVKRXOGWKH(8³JRYHUQ´FURVV-border EU competition actions? How should the EU 
legislator devise the relevant framework with a view to closing the enforcement gap and 
providing redress for those who have suffered harm as a result of an EU competition law 
infringement?  
 
1. One Step Adjudication Ȃ Closing the Enforcement Gap While providing for 
Certainty and Consistency  
As it was demonstrated,199 a two-step adjudication process, in which arguably a regulator is 
better placed to detect and establish an infringement and, subsequently, a court is better placed 
to award damages200 GRHVDIIHFWWKHOLWLJDQWV¶WDFWLFV,WOHDYHVDQHQIRUFHPHQWJDSLQVRIDr as 
the regulators across Europe would not have the resources to investigate all the EU competition 
law infringements.201 The evidential hurdles in follow-on actions may be seen as a deterrent for 
some injured parties EHFDXVH D ³SUREOHP DULVHV ZKHUH LQ WKH infringement decision, the 
competition authority is using the facts found by it to drive a particular theory, which may cause 
difficulties in a follow-on action if it becomes necessary to link the infringement to the facts of 
the case and, more particularO\ WKHIDFWV UHODWLQJ WRFDXVDWLRQDQG ORVV´202 Enron203 clearly 
VKRZVWKH³IDFWWKDWDQLQIULQJHPHQWKDVEHHQHVWDEOLVKHG>E\DUHJXODWRU@GRHVQRWVKRZDVD
QHFHVVDU\LPSOLFDWLRQWKDWVXFKGDPDJHKDVEHHQFDXVHG¶204 As already noted,205 some specific 
issues,206 which relate to the two-step adjudication process were put forward in Pfleiderer207 
and National Grid208 which may be seen as yet another evidence that it may be very difficult 
for an injured party in a follow-on action to prove that the cartel caused him loss.209 Although 
injured parties appear to believe that leniency material would be valuable to them, Webber 
VKRZVWKDW³WKHILOHRIHYLGHQFHKHOGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQLQFOXGLQJWKHOHQLHQF\PDWHULDOZDV
not compiled for this purpose and may therefore be of liPLWHGYDOXH´210 in a follow-on action. 
In other words, there is a strong case that the institutional architecture of antitrust enforcement 
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may need to be revamped, in order for the EU legislator to close the enforcement gap, which 
appears to exist at present, and to provide for consistent and efficient enforcement of EU 
competition law provisions across Europe.211 
Difficulties would often arise with regard to the parallel proceedings before a regulator, 
and a national court.212 Bos and Möhlmann213 have submitted that if a national court stays its 
proceedings until the decision of the European Commission (or a ruling given on it by a 
European Court) has become final and binding, then that national court would delay the 
adjudication on such a case for several years. It has been argued that a national court should 
aim to safeguard the rights of the litigants to have the case determined within a reasonable 
period of time in compliance with Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.214  
Also, given the cross-border nature of most EU competition law infringements, further 
issues are bound to arise because Regulation 1/2003 does not deal with the problem of coherent 
and uniform application of EU competition law in proceedings before an NCA located in one 
Member State and private EU antitrust law proceedings related to the same breaches of Article 
101 TFEU and/or Article 102 TFEU before a court in another Member State. As noted above,215 
the Union legislator has identified some of the problems in the proposed Directive, and, as a 
result, Article 9 addresses some of the problems in follow-on actions. However, there are some 
issues which need to be carefully considered. In particular, problems are bound to arise in 
parallel proceedings (as opposed to follow-on actions) since potentially irreconcilable decisions 
on the same (or a related) EU competition law issue by an English court, for example, and a 
foreign competition authority should be avoided.216 Furthermore, as already submitted,217 
proceedings before an NCA coXOGSRWHQWLDOO\UDLVHFRQFHUQVDVWRWKHXQGHUWDNLQJ¶VULJKWWRD
fair hearing.218 1D]]LQLKDVDUJXHGWKDWµWKHFXUUHQW(8FRPSHWLWLRQHQIRUFHPHQWUHJLPHZKLFK
is characterized by an administrative decision-maker with no guarantees of independence and 
imparWLDOLW\DQGGHIHUHQWLDOMXGLFLDOUHYLHZLVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO¶219 In view of that, mechanisms 
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allowing for some form of consolidation of the two sets of proceedings before national courts220 
might be desirable as the national courts would be best placed to be a major venue for 
competition law actions, if adequately supported by the NCAs and the European Commission.  
Judge Pelikánová221 addresses the problems by suggesting that the legislator should 
³OHDYHWRWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQVROHO\WKHLQTXLU\ZLWKWKHGXty to introduce a criminal or 
FLYLODFWLRQEHIRUHWKH&RXUW7KHV\VWHPZRXOGEHWWHUIXOILOWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKH(&+5´222 
Indeed, an one-step adjudication regime might be necessary if the EU legislator aims to provide 
DQ³HIIHFWLYHUHPHG\´223 for those who have suffered harm as a result of an EU competition law 
infringement. As noted elsewhere,224 it may be far from efficient to have one set of proceedings 
before an NCA in order to establish a breach of competition law, and another set of proceedings 
before Member State courts in order for a claimant to prove that damage has been caused to 
him.225 The procedural inefficiencies of the current two-step adjudication (i.e. before the 
regulator, and before the courts) increases uncertainty, which can fuel litigation costs, and could 
fly in the face of Article 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
An one-step adjudication regime may be useful with a view to addressing the problems 
before the courts in follow-on actions brought against defendants, who, despite being a part of 
DQ LQIULQJLQJ XQGHUWDNLQJ DUH QRW QDPHG LQ WKH RSHUDWLYH SDUW RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
infringement decision (i.e. dispositif).226 Moreover, the consolidation of proceedings before the 
national courts may be necessary if the EU legislator wants to make sure that the extent to which 
a company has made redress is taken into account by the competent authorities when 
determining what level of fine to impose.227 There is no scope for offsetting fines and damages 
in the current system.228 A public enforcement action would normally precede a damages 
action. The level of damages would be far from certain at the stage when an authority decides 
on the level of fines. Similarly, in a follow-on action, the court is supposed to award damages 
which would compensate the victim/s irrespective of the fine imposed by the competition 
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authority. This clearly shows that there is limited scope for consolidation of the fines and the 
damages in the current system, and consolidating both procedures before the national courts 
might be a good way to achieve this.229 One might question the desirability of consolidating the 
proceedings by putting forward that the objective of the fine (i.e. punish and deter) is different 
from the objective of the damages (i.e. compensation). However, in response to this, it might 
be suggested that an efficient enforcement policy would presuppose for all enforcement 
objectives (i.e. injunctive; punitive; compensatory)230 to be adequately pursued in consolidated 
proceedings. In other words, there seems to be a strong case that an efficient regime, which 
allows for all enforcement objectives to be pursued in one set of proceedings rather than in two 
sets of proceedings, might be the more appropriate way forward.  
The foregoing issues must be addressed head-on in Regulation 1/2003. A revised version 
of Regulation 1/2003 may also address the issue of taking evidence by a foreign NCA in support 
of private proceedings in a Member State. Indeed, the question of whether a Member State court 
FRXOGUHTXHVWHYLGHQFHIURPDQRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWH¶VFRPSHWLWLRQ authority in support of private 
proceedings in the former would have to be addressed by the Union legislator.  
However, how to provide redress for consumers in a cross-border context, bearing in 
mind the high litigation costs and the negligible amount of damage they may suffer across 
Europe?  
 
2. Effective Remedy in a Cross-border Context: Addressing the Low Mobility 
of Consumers and SMEs and Centralising Litigation 
7KHUHFHQWO\SURSRVHG&RPPLVVLRQ5HJXODWLRQVWDWHV WKDW³>D@OO0HPEHU6WDWHVVKRXOGKDYH
collective redress mechanisms at national level for both injunctive and compensatory relief, 
which respeFWWKHEDVLFSULQFLSOHVVHWRXWLQWKLV5HFRPPHQGDWLRQ´231 As already noted,232 the 
importance of the procedural aspects of the EU competition law claims brought by consumers 
(or on behalf of consumers) indicates that national legislators are best placed to deal with the 
VSHFLILF SUREOHP ,Q WKLV FRQWH[W ³0HPEHU 6WDWHV VKRXOG HQVXUH WKDW WKH FROOHFWLYH UHGUHVV
SURFHGXUHVDUHIDLUHTXLWDEOHWLPHO\DQGQRWSURKLELWLYHO\H[SHQVLYH´233 Similarly, the need 
for a legislative intervention had been identified already by the UK government. Following the 
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submission of the responses by members of the public, in January 2013, the UK government 
³GHFLGHG WR LQWURGXFH a limited opt-out collective actions regime, with safeguards, for 
competition law, with cases to be heard only in the Competition Appeal Tribunal´234 
However, the cross-border nature of most European competition law infringements, in which 
damages would often be suffered by businesses and consumers in a number of jurisdictions, 
could complicate the picture.235 BeaULQJ WKLV LQ PLQG ³>W@he Government has therefore 
GHFLGHG WKDW WKH µRSW-RXW¶DVSHFWRIDFODLPZLOORQO\DSSO\ WR8.-domiciled claimants 
>«@´236 The Consumer Rights Bill,237 brought forward a proposed amendment to Competition 
Act 1998, and went on specifying that: 
µ´Opt-out collective proceedings´ are collective proceedings which are brought on behalf of 
each class member except² 
(a) any class member who opts out by notifying the representative, in a manner and by a 
time specified, that the claim should not be included in the collective proceedings,  
and 
(b) any class member who² 
(i) is not domiciled in the United Kingdom at a time specified, and 
(ii) does not, in a manner and by a time specified, opt in by notifying the 
representative that the claim should be included in the collective 
proceedings.´238 
 
An opt-in regime applicable to out of jurisdiction claimants might appear to be in line 
with the proposed Commission Recommendation which states that:  
³The claimant party should be formed on the basis of express consent of the natural or legal 
SHUVRQVFODLPLQJWRKDYHEHHQKDUPHGµRSW-LQ¶SULQFLSOH$Q\H[FHSWLRQWRWKLVSULQFLSOHE\
law or by courWRUGHUVKRXOGEHGXO\MXVWLILHGE\UHDVRQVRIVRXQGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIMXVWLFH´239  
 
However, an opt-in regime applicable to out of jurisdiction claimants may be problematic 
in a cross-ERUGHUFRQWH[WEHFDXVHDVDUJXHGHOVHZKHUH³WKHDGRSWLRQRIWKHopt-in regime in 
UHVSHFWRIDSODLQWLII¶VFODVVGRPLFLOHG LQDQRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWH >«@ZLOO LQHYLWDEO\ OHDG WR
parallel collective redress proceedings, pending before different Member State courts, in respect 
of the same infringement raising similar issues of faFWDQGODZ´240 Having a number of Member 
State courts seised with related EU competition law actions, which raise similar issues of fact 
DQG ODZ ZRXOG IO\ LQ WKH IDFH RI WKH DLP RI WKH 8QLRQ OHJLVODWRU WR ³HQVXUH WKH HIIHFWLYH
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enforcement of the EU competiWLRQUXOHV´241 because the high level of uncertainty, which fuels 
litigation costs at present, would persist in cross-border actions. Indeed, Section 17 of the 
proposed Commission Recommendation states that:  
³7KH0HPEHU6WDWHVVKRXOGHQVXUHWKDWZKHUHDGLVpute concerns natural or legal persons from 
several Member States, a single collective action in a single forum is not prevented by national 
rules on admissibility or standing of the foreign groups of claimants or the representative entities 
originating frRPRWKHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOV\VWHPV´242  
 
Therefore, there is a strong case that the UK government proposal introducing an opt-in 
regime applicable to out of jurisdiction claimants might need to be modified in the light of the 
proposed Recommendation. The low mobility of consumers might be an important factor to be 
considered when devising an effective enforcement regime with a view to promoting inter-
jurisdictional regulatory competition. In particular, an opt-out regime applicable to out of 
jurisdiction claimaQWVDGRSWHGE\D0HPEHU6WDWHPLJKWEHQHFHVVDU\WRSURYLGHDQ³HIIHFWLYH
UHPHG\´ ZLWKLQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI $UWLFOH  RI WKH &KDUWHU RI )XQGDPHQWDO 5LJKWV IRU
consumers from across Europe. Also, such a solution might create incentives for defendants to 
settle and achieve finality with a large number of businesses and consumers (i.e. speedy and 
efficient dispute resolution). In other words, an effective enforcement regime should take 
account of the cross-border nature of EU competition law infringements, and the fact that 
groups of companies engage in anti-competitive conduct through their subsidiaries in a number 
of Member States. How to devise an effective redress mechanism which is to be applied in the 
European context? 
It is well established that consumers may suffer damage as direct or indirect purchasers. 
Danov, Fairgrieve and Howells243 illustrate that ³a gatekeeper can be a major help in organising 
consumers´ due to the high litigation costs and negligible amount of antitrust damages suffered 
by the numerous individual consumers across Europe. If the consumers in question are direct 
purchasers, then consumer associations would be best placed to organise consumers and bring 
representative actions aggregating numerous relatively small damage claims on behalf of the 
consumers on an opt-out basis. However, even if an opt-out regime were introduced, the 
consumer associations may not be well placed to bring EU competition law damages claims in 
FDVHV ZKHUH ³FRQVXPHUV GR QRW EX\ GLUHFWO\ IURP PDQXIDFWXUHUV but instead from 
PLGGOHPHQ´244 In particular, there may be evidential hurdles in claims brought on behalf of 
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FRQVXPHUV DVPDQ\ RI WKHPPD\QRWNHHS WKHLU VDOH UHFHLSWV IRU H[DPSOH7KH³HYLGHQWLDO
difficulties (in the sense that it may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the court the facts 
WKDWGRH[LVWRUZRXOGKDYHH[LVWHGLQWKHµQRFDUWHO¶ZRUOG´245 have been put forward before 
the High Court by counsel in Devenish246 where the claims were brought by companies. The 
evidential hurdles in claims by consumers would be exacerbated by the difficulties caused by 
the fact that the damage suffered by an individual consumer may be very difficult to ascertain 
as its amount may indeed be negligible in some cases.247 For example, this appears to be the 
case in Emerald.248 ,IRQHDVVXPHVWKDWWKHFODLPDQWVZKRZHUHFXWIORZHUV¶LPSRUWHUVKDYH
passed the overcharge down to the end buyer of a bouquet of cut flowers, then it would be far 
from easy to ascertain how much of the price of the bouquet was increased as a result of the 
overcharge, in order for it to be claimed back by the individual consumers. Another case which 
may be used to illustrate the difficulties is Devenish. If one assumes that the cartel-induced 
overcharge in selling a unit of vitamins to Devenish Nutrition was £40249 and the cartelised 
product was purchased by them to manufacture speciality products for the intensive livestock 
sector, then how much of the cartel-induced overcharge contributes to the raised price which is 
ultimately paid by the end consumer?250 It is beyond doubt that if a claim is brought by the end 
FRQVXPHU WKHQ ³WKH QRQ-assessable cost of responding to discovery and the like will 
VXEVWDQWLDOO\HURGHLIQRWH[FHHGDQ\UHFRYHU\´251 
Bearing in mind that, due to high litigation costs, it is the large companies that generally 
appear to be bringing EU competition law damages actions, it has been suggested that one way 
of closing the enforcement gap in Europe would be to allow large purchasers, for example, to 
aggregate claims on behalf of purchasers down the chain of distribution (including end 
consumers).252 Such a solution would not only address the passing-on problems (as identified 
by the Commission),253 but it also would allow large companies to aggregate claims on behalf 
of consumers of a cartelised product and/or consumers who are paying a monopoly price. In 
such cases, a gatekeeping role will be performed by the judges who would exercise judicial 
control over the cases at the certification stage. The volume of sales of the large purchasers, 
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who have opted into the collective redress proceedings, can be an objective criterion in 
assessing their adequacy to act as representatives of the end consumers who would be involved 
on an opt-out basis. Such a proposal inter alia would address some of the problems regarding 
the passing-on defence.254 To this end, it would be essential to have an appropriately devised 
certification regime which requires a judge to identify the Member States where the businesses 
(or the consumer associations) that have opted in to the action operate and direct their activities 
to. For example, if the action was brought by a large purchaser, then the courts may certify that 
the opt-in direct purchasers are suitable representatives of the claimants from several Member 
States by identifying the volume of their sales (or the sales of their subsidiaries) in the countries 
in question. In other words, the volume of sales of the businesses, which have opted into the 
collective redress proceedings, can be an objective criterion in assessing their adequacy to act 
as representatives of the end consumers from the Member States in which, for example, a 
cartelised product has been sold.255 How to address the low mobility of consumers and SMEs, 
which, due to the high cross-border litigation costs, may defeat any regime that aims to promote 
regulatory competition?  
Once an effective redress mechanism had been implemented, the issue of mobility of 
large purchasers (and consumer organisations) could be addressed by an appropriately drafted 
private international law mechanism which would be best incorporated in Regulation 1/2003. 
Although it would be difficult to elaborate a special basis for jurisdiction which requires a 
substantial connection between the breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the effects of the 
anti-competitive agreement or conduct within the territory of the Member State where the action 
is brought and in respect of which the EU antitrust law claim is brought,256 there is a need for a 
jurisdiction rule which allows an injured party to centralise litigation against a group of the 
same companies before the courts at his preferred jurisdiction. Where, for example, there is a 
corporate group with numerous subsidiaries (all of whom form a single infringing undertaking), 
then it should be open for an injured party by establishing jurisdiction against one of the 
subsidiaries to centralise litigation against the whole group of companies as well as against the 
other group/s of companies who were party to the same anti-competitive agreement. This could 
be justified by the fact that EU competition law infringements would often directly and 
substantially affect the markets in several countries and/or regions.257  
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Such a broad jurisdiction rule must be accompanied by appropriately drafted rules which 
allow the parties to avoid parallel EU competition law proceedings, and centralise litigation 
before the court that is clearly appropriate to deal with the case, avoiding the problem of 
irreconcilable or inconsistent judgments. Indeed, ensuring finality of judgments presupposes an 
appropriately designed mechanism which allows the parties to avoid parallel EU competition 
law. In view of that, Regulation 1/2003 should go a step further and allow the court first seised 
to stay proceedings, in cases where the agreement or practice has no substantial direct effects 
(whether actual or foreseeable) on competition within the Member State and where another 
court is better placed to deal with the case.258 Although such a rule could work well in theory, 
the proposed solution in practice may bring even more uncertainty unless there are clear criteria 
for the courts on the basis of which they can exercise their discretion. If the Union legislator 
decides to promote regulatory competition, then procedural laws, experience of judges, 
potential delays as well as heads of damages and remedies could perhaps be considered as 
relevant criteria in the context of parallel proceedings with a view to closing the enforcement 
gap in Europe.  
Another specific issue, which needs to be addressed by the EU legislator in a revised 
version of Regulation 1/2003, concerns the preclusive effects of opt-out collective redress 
judgments/settlements.259 An appropriate solution260 would be to hold that the recognising court 
should apply a presumption that the opt-out collective EU competition law redress regimes of 
other Member States are compliant with Article 6(1) of the Human Rights Convention as well 
as with Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.261 Indeed, 
such an approach might find support in Article 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQZKLFKVWDWHVWKDW³>H@YHU\RQHZKRVHULJKWVDQGIUHHGRPVJXDUDQWHHGE\
WKH ODZ RI WKH 8QLRQ DUH YLRODWHG KDV WKH ULJKW WR DQ HIIHFWLYH UHPHG\ >«@´262 Hence, the 
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(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VHIIRUWVWRFORse the enforcement gap, which would be important for 
Europe to achieve sustainable economic growth, as well as the policy-PDNHUV¶ LPSHWXV WR
provide redress for those, who have suffered damages as a result of an EU competition law 
infringement, by encouraging collective redress antitrust proceedings in Europe might be strong 
arguments favouring the proposed approach.263 
Therefore, there is a strong case that an efficient EU private international law regime 
would be crucial to devising an appropriate governance mode and providing effective remedies 
for victims of EU competition law infringements in a cross-border context. 
 
F. CONCLUSION: OTHER ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED IN A BROADER EUROPEAN 
CONTEXT 
7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSDFNDJHRIOHJLVODWLYHSURSRVDOVPD\EHregarded as an important 
step towards the creation of an effective EU competition law enforcement regime in Europe. 
Given the diverse nature of the European Union and in the light of the proposed Directive, it 
seems that a private international law mechanism which promotes inter-jurisdictional 
regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust law dispute resolution may need to be 
employed by the EU legislator as a new mode of governance which might produce efficient 
enforcement results in a multi-level system of governance. Also, one-stop adjudication must 
replace the current two-step adjudication enforcement regime, in which arguably a regulator is 
better placed to detect and establish an infringement and, subsequently, a court is better placed 
to award damages.264 Although, the proposed Directive and the relative importance of the 
procedural rules might suggest that a national legislator could be best placed to address the 
problems, the low mobility of consumers and SMEs, which may defeat any regime that aims to 
promote regulatory competition, must be addressed by appropriately drafted private 
international rules which should be incorporated in Regulation 1/2003. 
Whilst Regulation 1/2003 could address the specific competition law problems, 
employing a private international law instrument in the context of cross-border EU competition 
law enforcement would suggest that an institutional reform, which might consider the role of 
the EU courts, would need to be considered in a wider context. The need for such a reform was 
first signalled by a Report by the Working Party on the Future of the European Communities' 
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Court System.265 7KHUHSRUWFOHDUO\VWDWHGWKDWµ«WKH:RUNLQJ3DUW\FRQVLGHUVWKDWSUHOLPLQDU\
questions concerning judicial cooperation should be withdrawn from the Court of Justice and 
assigned to a Community court with members drawn from specialist private international 
ODZ\HUV¶266 6LPLODUO\ +LOO KDV VXEPLWWHG WKDW µ7KH VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW ZLWKLQ WKH (&- WKHUH
should be established a specialist chamber (of PIL experts) to deal with references under the 
Brussels I Regulation (and other PIL instruments) has been knocking around for well over 30 
\HDUV6XFKUHIRUPLVVHULRXVO\RYHUGXH¶267 The current institutional architecture might need to 
be reviewed if the EU legislator decided to employ a more sophisticated private international 
law mechanism when allocating jurisdiction and identifying the applicable law in cross-border 
private EU competition law actions, which seem to pose particularly acute problems under the 
current system.268 
Indeed, the increased importance of private international law for disputes in civil and 
commercial matters, which may affect businesses, consumers and families, raises concerns as 
to the costs of cross-border litigation as well as to the uniform application of the various private 
international law instruments across the Member States within the EU. This could potentially 
undermine the rule of law because the high costs and the high level of uncertainty could 
adversely affect cross-border FODLPDQWV¶ OLWLJLRXVQHVV DV D QXPEHU RI injured parties may 
believe that the risks of litigation outweigh the benefits.269 Such an outcome would fly in the 
IDFHRIWKH6WRFNKROP3URJUDPPHZKLFKDLPVWRFUHDWH³D(XURSHRIODZDQGMXVWLFH´270 An 
important hypothesis, which needs to be investigated by a cross-border research consortium, is 
that the increased reliance on harmonised private international law instruments in the EU 
indicates that the preliminary references seeking their interpretation should go to a special 
European Court or a specialised chamber of the Court of Justice.271  
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